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Delimitation of the territorial waters and continental shelf in the Aegean Sea constitutes
a constant source of conflict and produces recurrent crises between Greece and Turkey.
This article explores directions that the Greek–Turkish dispute over the delimitation of
territorial waters can take through an evolutionary game framework. Crises are found
to follow routines and practices involving challenges to the status quo and reactions
preceding mutual retreat. Hence, the status quo in the Aegean Sea can persist even in
the form of aggressive behavior. It is also possible that the dispute will evolve into a
stable state of conflict where no cooperative foreign policy can survive.
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Periodic crises over the delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea indicate a distinct
pattern in relations between Greece and Turkey. While governments, political leaders, and
sometimes regimes in both countries change, intermittent phases of conflict escalation and
de-escalation punctuate Greek–Turkish relations. Lacking a theoretical perspective, the rich
literature on the Aegean dispute and overall Greek–Turkish relations does not explain the
recurrence of crises or predict possible future paths (see, among others, Bahcheli, 1990,
2000; Clogg, 1983; Constas, 1991; Coufoudakis, 1993, 1985; Couloumbis, 1983; Krebs,
1999; Larrabee, 1992; Papacosma, 1994; Veremis, 1984; Wilson, 1984). Why do these crises
occur periodically? Should new crises be expected? In this paper, we attempt to answer these
questions using an evolutionary game. The game analysis establishes a unique evolutionarily
stable equilibrium characterized by persistent Greek challenges to the status quo in the
Aegean Sea and aggressive Turkish reactions. The periodicity of hawkish (aggressive)
and dovish (non-aggressive) foreign policies corresponds to evolutionary instability and
recurrent crises.
First, we provide a succinct overview of the issue. We then lay out the framework
that presents basic evolutionary game assumptions, the model, and the equilibrium condi-
tions. The section on empirical analysis includes short histories of crises, the evolutionary
narrative, and resulting implications. The conclusion points to possible extensions and ap-
plications of the model.
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The Issue and Positions
Currently, both countries, the only littoral states in the Aegean Sea, apply a six-mile limit
to establish the breadth of their territorial waters. The current delimitation makes Greek
territorial waters approximately equal to 43.68% of the Aegean, Turkish territorial waters
7.46%, and the high seas up to 48.85%. Should the Greeks begin applying the twelve-mile
rule, as they claim to do on occasion, these percentages would respectively become 71.53%,
8.76%, and 19.71% (Ahnish, 1993, 267–268, Wilson, 1984, 94).
The treaty of Lausanne fixed the extension of the littoral states’ territorial waters at
three miles in 1923. Greece extended its territorial waters to six miles in 1936. The current
status quo formed when Turkey accepted the six-mile limit in 1964. According to the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was signed in 1982 and entered into
force in 1994, signatory states have the right to expand their territorial waters out to twelve
miles. Greece, unlike Turkey, is a signatory to the UNCLOS.
Greece considers the determination of its breadth of territorial waters to be a sovereign
right. It claims that it will extend its territorial waters in the future. Since Turkey did not
sign the treaty, Ankara considers the threatened Greek move as casus belli.1 Greece asserts
that the Turkish position of casus belli is against Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter,
according to which members cannot threaten others’ territorial integrity. Turkey claims that
its position stems from Article 300 of the UNCLOS, according to which parties can exercise
the rights UNCLOS recognizes unless these create an abuse of right. Turkey insists that
maritime transport between Turkish ports would require Greek permission if Greece extends
its territorial waters up to twelve miles. According to Turkey, the Aegean is a semiclosed
sea requiring the application of particular rules. Greece does not consider the Aegean as a
semiclosed sea, therefore making the twelve-mile limit applicable.
The continental shelf issue is the only one that Greece considers negotiable regarding
the Aegean Sea. Greece supports the territorial integrity thesis, according to which islands
and the mainland form a contiguous whole. Turkey, on the other hand, supports drawing
an equidistant line between Greek and Turkish continental land masses to delimit their
respective continental shelves. The issues of the continental shelf and territorial waters are
inextricably linked: “While most Aegean quarreling has centered on the continental shelf, the
territorial sea issue is the one that is most vital for Turkey. The two issues are not unrelated,
since all of the shelf claimed by Greece would accrue to it automatically, were it able to
implement a twelve-mile territorial claim” (Bahcheli, 2000, 134). A revised status quo if
both littoral states were to extend their territorial waters to twelve miles implies the undersea
connection of the Greek mainland with thousands of Greek islands and islets scattered in
the Aegean, and, therefore a considerable Greek gain of continental shelf (Ahnish, 1993,
269–270). Hence, overall, Greek and Turkish positions are strictly opposed over the Aegean
Sea.
Evolutionary Framework
Evolutionary games are tools used to investigate modes of behavior in large populations of
individuals such as insects, animals, plants, or humans. The survival of an individual in these
populations may depend upon the mode of behavior adopted by all others. If almost every
individual is passive, only a passive individual may survive in the population. Similarly, only
a proactive individual may continue to exist in a largely proactive population. One mode of
1Greek and Turkish official positions are available on www.mfa.gr and www.mfa.gov.tr,
respectively.
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behavior can produce a higher or a lower fitness (payoff) than another one depending upon
the mode of behavior generally prevalent in a population.
In our case, individuals in the population are political leaders and high-ranking bureau-
crats. They adopt modes of behavior termed “templates,” that is, fixed strategic prescriptions
implying ideas or procedures (Levy, 1994, 299). Numerous individuals can follow the same
template. If almost all policymakers follow the same template, then those individuals who
adhere to a different template may become extinct. The extinction of individuals has no
biological meaning; instead, it implies individuals’ conversion to the most successful mode
of behavior.
Individuals are not assumed to possess perfect skills of computation and foresight
(Kandori, Mailath, & Rob, 1993, 29; Friedman, 1998, 20). While they can make mistakes,
they imitate those who adhere to successful templates. Some templates bring higher fitness,
and so, over time, more policymakers follow them. As a result, successful foreign policy
procedures and ideas attract new followers. In evolutionary terms, imitated behavior drives
foreign policy. Those templates that fail disappear gradually, because a lesser number of in-
dividuals tend to adopt them over time. Hence, learning is possible under limited rationality
conditions. There is one limitation, though: the number of adherents to a template does not
change too abruptly, as learning takes time (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998, 88; Selten, 1991,
9–11).
Thus, in general, the evolutionary assumptions permit us to study slow changes in
foreign policy. Specifically, the framework implies that: (1) Greek and Turkish modes of
behavior over the Aegean territorial waters issue are not necessarily optimal when mutually
paired; (2) these modes of behavior do not indicate a conscious effort to shape each other;
(3) they do not suddenly change; (4) adherents to successful strategic prescriptions increase
in number. Hence, first, some templates vanish while some survive, and, second, some are
discovered to be working better than others through social learning or satisficing. The for-
mer refers to the imitation of templates bringing higher than average payoffs and the latter
to the reinforcement of those that “do well” in the sense of following routines and engag-
ing in myopic search rather than rational optimization (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998, 87–95;
Allison, 1971, 67–100).
The Model
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that only two templates exist: the hawk and the dove.
The Greek hawk, unlike the Greek dove, challenges the status quo in the Aegean Sea. Sim-
ilarly, the Turkish hawk supports aggressive action, unlike the Turkish dove. Hawkish and
dovish templates prescribe different actions in Greek and Turkish populations. Hence, Greek
and Turkish populations are assumed to be strategically distinct from each other. These def-
initions approximate empirical observations of Greek–Turkish conflict over the Aegean Sea
and the, respectively, aggressive/nonaggressive traits of hawks and doves in theory.
Hawks and doves of one population are repeatedly and randomly matched to those
of the other. This yields the following possible pairs: Greek hawk versus Turkish hawk
(hawk–hawk), Greek dove versus Turkish dove (dove–dove), Greek hawk versus Turkish
dove (hawk–dove), and Greek dove versus Turkish hawk (dove–hawk). If hawks (doves)
obtain a higher average fitness, then the fraction of hawks (doves) grows in the population,
and, accordingly, foreign policy becomes progressively hawkish (dovish).
The status quo remains intact in dove–dove contests, as Greek doves do not challenge
the status quo and Turkish doves do not aggressively react. The status quo payoffs are
normalized to zero for convenience. The payoffs realized in other pairs are measured relative
to the outcome of dove–dove contests.
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Hawk–hawk contests, which consist of a Greek challenge and a Turkish reaction,
are conflictive and therefore costly. Both sets of hawks either win resources or lose and
suffer costs. The value of the undisturbed status quo is the Turkish resource. If Turkish
hawks win, the status quo is not upset, similar to the outcome in dove–dove encounters.
Accordingly, successful Turkish hawks in hawk–hawk contests obtain zero and may even
fail and suffer some costs in these encounters. While the Greek territorial-waters surplus is
approximately 36% under the six-mile limit, it will become 63% if the twelve-mile norm
becomes the rule. The Greek territorial increment, which will then be about 27%, is defined
as the Greek resource. Thus, successful Greek hawks obtain 0.27 in hawk–hawk contests.
Yet, it is also likely that Greek hawks fail and suffer some costs when they face Turkish
hawks.
Therefore, Turkish hawks face the following lottery in hawk–hawk encounters: p(0) +
(1 − p)(−WT) = WT (p−1), where −WT denotes costs Turkish hawks suffer when matched
with Greek hawks, p the likelihood that Turkish hawks prevail in their encounters with Greek
hawks, and (1 − p) the likelihood that Greek hawks prevail when they are matched with
Turkish hawks.2 Greek hawks similarly expect p(−WG) + (1 − p)(0.27) = −WG p +
(1 − p)0.27, where −WG denotes costs Greek hawks suffer in hawk–hawk contests. We
assume that 1 > p > 0. Hawks, either Greek or Turkish, do not win resources or suffer
costs with certainty when paired with each other. The expected payoffs of outcomes where
hawks are matched with hawks reflect that the values of the resource, that is, the Greek gain
from a revised status quo and the Turkish gain from a continued status quo, are reduced by
respective costs.
Greek hawks challenge the status quo and Turkish doves do not retaliate. As a result,
a new status quo is obtained in hawk–dove contests, with Greek hawks simply obtaining
27% and suffering no costs. The Greek territorial increment also reduces Turkish territory
by the same amount in the Aegean Sea in the context of diametrically opposed Greek and
Turkish positions. Greek hawks and Turkish doves therefore obtain 0.27 and −0.27 in their
encounters, respectively. Turkish doves suffer a tremendous loss when paired with Greek
hawks. Accordingly, Turkish hawks are assumed to be more successful than Turkish doves
when both types encounter Greek hawks: −0.27 < WT(p − 1).
In contrast to hawk–dove encounters, both types suffer costs and realize no gains in
dove–hawk contests. The Greek dove does not challenge the status quo, but the Turkish
hawk reacts. Both types suffer costs from Turkish bellicosity. The parameters −UG and −UT
measure, respectively, the costs of Greek doves and Turkish hawks in dove–hawk contests.
Failures in fully conflictive hawk–hawk contests generate high costs. Therefore, Greek
doves paired with Turkish hawks are assumed to experience lesser costs than failing Greek
hawks in hawk–hawk contests: −WG < −UG. Turkish hawks also attract international
reactions against their unfounded aggressiveness. These reactions can even offset Greek
doves’ costs and produce net benefits for Greek doves.
These assumptions imply the game shown in Figure 1.
Equilibria
Let x be the fraction of Turkish hawks in the Turkish population. The fraction of Turkish
doves is therefore 1− x . In the Greek population, hawk and dove fractions are, respectively,
y and 1 − y. We now compute expected payoffs for each template in Greek and Turkish
populations.
2The likelihood p does not denote Greek and Turkish perceptions of Turkish victory.
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FIGURE 1 The game.
Greek hawks expect
x[−WGp + (1 − p)0.27] + (1 − x)(0.27),
as the probability of being matched with a Turkish hawk is x and the probability of being
matched with a Turkish dove is 1 − x . Similarly, for Greek doves, we have
x(−UG) + (1 − x)(0) = x(−UG),
since they are matched with a Turkish hawk with probability x and with a Turkish dove
with probability 1 − x .
Turkish hawks expect
y[WT(p − 1)] + (1 − y)(−UT),
as they can be matched with probability y with a Greek hawk and with probability 1 − y
with a Greek dove. As to Turkish doves, they can encounter either Greek hawks or Greek
doves with y and 1 − y probabilities, respectively. Therefore, they expect
y(−0.27) + (1 − y)(0) = −0.27y.
In the Greek population, hawks have a greater fitness than doves when
x[−WGp + (1 − p)0.27] + (1 − x)(0.27) > x(−UG).
Let γ1 denote the ratio (0.27 + UG)/(0.27 + WG). If p > γ1, the following conditions are
implied.
1. If 0.27/[p(WG + 0.27) − UG] > x , then the proportion of Greek hawks increases in the
Greek population.
2. If 0.27/[p(WG + 0.27) − UG] < x , then the proportion of Greek doves increases in the
Greek population.
In the Turkish population, the hawk fitness is greater when:
y[WT(p − 1)] + (1 − y)(−UT) > −0.27y.
Thus we obtain the following further conditions.
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3. If UT/[UT + 0.27 + WT (p − 1)] < y, then the proportion of Turkish hawks increases in
the Turkish population.
4. If UT/[UT + 0.27 + WT (p − 1)] > y, then the proportion of Turkish doves increases in
the Turkish population.
Let α and β denote, respectively, UT/[UT + 0.27 + WT (p − 1)] and 0.27/[p(WG +
0.27)−UG]. Both thresholds are positive, smaller than 1, and indicate population mixtures.
They generate four cells numbered clockwise I, II, III, and IV in the phase diagram in
Figure 2.
Greek and Turkish doves expand in the cell I, Greek hawks and Turkish doves expand
in the cell II, Greek and Turkish hawks expand in the cell III, Greek doves and Turkish
hawks expand in the cell IV. Boldface arrows indicate a continuous clockwise rotation
in hawk–dove mixtures in Greek and Turkish populations and therefore no evolutionary
stability.
The variations in UG and WG modify the critical ratio γ1 that decrease in WG and
increase in UG. The ratio γ1 increases when, paired with Turkish hawks, the costs of Greek
doves increase or the costs of Greek hawks decrease. As there are lesser chances for p to
exceed higher values of γ1, the prospects for Greek and Turkish doves to become extinct are
higher in this case. Hence, an acute conflict can become evolutionarily stable. Otherwise,
if Greek doves suffer less than Greek hawks in their respective encounters with Turkish
FIGURE 2 Phase diagram 1.
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FIGURE 3 Phase diagram 2.
hawks, the ratio becomes smaller. As a result, there are greater chances for p to exceed
lower values of γ1 and for crises and détente periods to recur in succession.
If p < γ1, hawkish templates become evolutionarily stable in both populations. Greek
hawks repeatedly achieve a greater fitness than Greek doves given that Turkish hawks
prevail with a probability less than γ1. There no longer exists a threshold under which
Greek hawks could lose the influence in the Greek population. As a result, Greek hawks
proliferate until they comprise the whole population, while Greek doves become extinct.
In the phase diagram in Figure 3, Turkish doves fare better than Turkish hawks as long as
the fraction of Greek hawks stays below β (cell I). Turkish hawks become more successful
than Turkish doves once the growth of the Greek hawk fraction exceeds β. Hence, Turkish
hawks multiply in the Turkish population as well. If Greek hawks are so numerous as to
already make up a fraction greater than β (cell II), then Turkish hawks only obtain a higher
fitness. Therefore, if p < γ1, Greek–Turkish relations over the Aegean Sea evolve towards
a stable but conflictive situation as doves disappear in both populations.
If Greek doves benefit from Turkish aggression, the condition for greater hawk fitness
in the Greek population becomes
x[−WGp + (1 − p)0.27] + (1 − x)(0.27) > x(UG).
Provided that p > (0.27 − UG)/(0.27 + WG), the following conditions are implied:
5. If 0.27/[p (WG + 0.27) + UG] > x , then the proportion of Greek hawks increases in the
Greek population.
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TABLE 1 Evolutionary implications
Turkish fitness Greek fitness
Conditions on p assumptions assumptions Evolutionary stability
1 > p > 0 0 > −WT, −UT 0 > −UG > −WG No evolutionary stability
p > γ1 −0.27 < WT(p − 1) Recurrent crises
1 > p > 0 0 > −WT, −UT UG > 0 > −WG No evolutionary stability
p > γ2 −0.27 < WT(p − 1) Recurrent crises
1 > p > 0 0 > −WT, −UT 0 > −UG > −WG Evolutionary stability:
p < γ1 −0.27 < WT(p − 1) Doves get extinct.
1 > p > 0 0 > −WT, −UT UG > 0 > −WG Evolutionary stability:
p < γ2 −0.27 < WT(p − 1) Doves get extinct.
6. If 0.27/[p (WG + 0.27) + UG] < x , then the proportion of Greek doves increases in the
Greek population.
The evolutionary trajectories do not change without altering Turkish fitness assump-
tions. Let γ2 denote the ratio (0.27 − UG)/(0.27 + WG). There is no evolutionary stability
provided that p > γ2; otherwise, an evolutionary stability is reached if p < γ2.
The ratio γ2 decreases in both WG and UG. The higher these parameters, the greater are
the chances for p to exceed a low γ2. Hence, if the benefits that accrue to Greek doves from
Turkish reactions or the costs to Greek hawks of being paired with Turkish hawks increase,
then there are greater prospects for no evolutionary stability. Otherwise, Greek–Turkish
controversy over the Aegean Sea will reach a state of stable conflict.
Overall, the survival of doves separates crises from acute conflicts. In acute conflicts,
both populations contain hawks only and the prospect of war appears as genuine as in
brinkmanship crises. However, crises taper off with the growth of doves in at least one
population. Hence, the difference between brinkmanship crises and acute conflicts is the
survival of doves. Mutant doves have no chance of surviving in acute conflicts.
Table 1 summarizes overall conditions for evolutionary stability and instability.
Empirical Analysis
Crises
Recurrent crises are observable. As Table 2 indicates, they correspond to different govern-
ments in power in Greece and Turkey.3
Crisis 1
Greece granted oil exploration licenses in the Aegean Sea in 1970; this oil was dis-
covered to cover about 10% of Greek oil requirements in 1972 (Papacosma, 1996, 81).
Although Greece claimed it was granting these licenses for oil exploration on its own con-
tinental shelf, there was no immediate Turkish reaction. In fact, the Turkish government
under the premiership of Naim Talu permitted the Turkish national oil company to drill in
high seas in November 1973.
Demetrios Ioannidis, a hard-line member of the Greek junta, overthrew George
Papadopoulos (the chief engineer of the 1967 military coup) in November 1973.
3Data sets on international crises and territorial conflicts do not indicate the sizes of hawk and
dove factions in interacting populations (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997; Huth, 1998).
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TABLE 2 Greek and Turkish prime ministers, 1972–2003.
Legend: M: Markezinis, T: Tzannetakis, G: Givas, P: Papandreou: E: Ecevit, D: Demirel, Y: Yılmaz.
İ: İnönü, Ç: Çiller.
Greek–Turkish relations reached a nadir after Ioannidis and his supporters came to power.
The Turkish government led by Bülent Ecevit, a moderate left-leaning, populist leader, re-
placed the government of Naim Talu in January 1974. Key Turkish bureaucrats were more
receptive to a firmer and a more active foreign policy in response to Greek actions in the
Aegean. Indeed, in May 1974, a Turkish ship escorted by warships conducted a seismic
search in disputed areas. Under Greek protests, Turkey argued that these areas were on a line
extending from the Anatolian peninsula and forming the Turkish continental shelf. Greek
and Turkish troops went on alert. The crisis remained insignificant next to the developments
in Cyprus and the Turkish military intervention on the island in July 1974 (Bahcheli, 1990,
131).
Constantine Karamanlis, a moderate-right Greek leader, assumed government power
in July 1974 after the military junta was ousted. The Greek search for oil in disputed areas
nonetheless continued under the leadership of Karamanlis. By that time, there were also
political changes in Turkey. Süleyman Demirel, a moderate-right leader, was the Turkish
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premier, with Bülent Ecevit in opposition. The Demirel government later abandoned the
idea of adjudicating the conflict following harsh criticism from the opposition and opted
for a more assertive foreign policy. An acute crisis arose in August 1976 after Sismik I,
a Turkish exploration ship, started to conduct seismic research. PASOK leader Andreas
Papandreou demanded that the Greek government sink the Turkish ship, making an overt
conflict imminent.4 Given the severe nature of the Greek reaction, the Turkish government
declared that any move by Greece to extend its territorial waters would constitute a casus
belli.
The Karamanlis government did not order the sinking of Sismik I, as recommended by
Papandreou; rather, it submitted the case to the UN and the International Court of Justice.
These political moves resulted in a denial of the Greek request by the International Court
of Justice and in a resolution by the UN Security Council. The tension later eased with a
Greek–Turkish agreement signed in Bern in November 1976. Greece and Turkey pledged
to keep each other informed about their exploration activities and to respect the status quo
in the Aegean Sea.
Crisis 2
Andreas Papandreou formed the government after his party won the general elections
of 1981. The Bern agreement did not survive the electoral victory of PASOK: “Bilateral
relations resumed in earnest after Berne, and although no settlement emerged, neither
side questioned their usefulness until Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK government came to
power in Greece in 1981” (Bahcheli, 1990, 137). PASOK indeed followed a hard-line policy
regarding the Aegean issue (Wilson, 1984, 115).
A similar type of crisis occurred in 1987. Greece started to grant licenses for oil
exploration once again, disregarding the Bern agreement. Turkey reacted by launching an
exploration ship out the high seas and the two countries’ forces were mobilized subsequently.
While the situation could easily have culminated in a Greek–Turkish war during late March,
following the movement of the Turkish ship in disputed waters, tension eased within days,
as Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal met in Davos and reached an
understanding.
Crisis 3
The two countries nonetheless relived another crisis in 1996, this time over the Imia/
Kardak rocks. These islets lie 3.8 miles off the Turkish coast and 5.3 miles from the Greek
island Kalymnos. Tension rose after a Turkish ship ran aground on one of these rocks.
The conflict escalated when Greek and Turkish military forces were dispatched to the
area. The crisis died out a few weeks later. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis (PASOK)
and Turkish President Süleyman Demirel issued the Madrid Communiqué in 1997 at the
NATO summit, where they stressed the importance of peaceful relations and cooperation
between their countries.
Evolutionary Narrative
The Greek search for oil in 1970 in disputed waters prima facie indicates that the fraction
of the Greek population that challenges the status quo in the Aegean Sea was on the
rise. Hawkish Greek policy was rooted in the military dictatorship that governed Greece
between 1967 and 1974. The extreme right-wing colonels forming the Greek junta preferred
tough policies against Turkey (Veremis, 1984, 18). Wilson (1984, 112) remarks that there
4PASOK is the Greek acronym for the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement.
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was “no Turkish reaction” to Greek claims for three years. Thus, Greek hawks repeatedly
encountered acquiescent Turkish doves. Greek hawks were more successful than Greek
doves, with Turkish hawks constituting a fraction lower than β. Imitating the successful
template, a greater number of Greek policymakers were converted to hawks. As a result,
Greek foreign policy became gradually more hawkish. Greek hawks and Turkish doves
expanded for a period corresponding to cell II of the phase diagram 1 (Figure 2). The
evolutionary trajectory then took a turn upward and approached α.
Consentient Turkish foreign policy declined once Greek hawks constituted a fraction
higher than α. Turkish hawks did not lose the Turkish resource in the Aegean Sea as
certainly as Turkish doves did. Thus they began to obtain a greater fitness than Turkish
doves in relatively frequent encounters with Greek hawks. The Talu government’s reaction
in 1973 lends credibility to the onset of the hawks’ rise in the Turkish population: “having
failed to challenge the Greeks in the Aegean for more than a decade (until 1973), the Turks
wanted to avoid the appearance of acquiescence” (Bahcheli, 1990, 134). The propagation of
Greek hawks triggered the growth of Turkish hawks. For example, Bülent Ecevit criticized
the Demirel government’s agreement to bring the continental shelf issue to the International
Court of Justice. Wilson (1984, 109), commenting on Ecevit’s behavior, notes: “This was
the more remarkable in view of Mr Ecevit’s record in opposition, where he had frequently
spurred Turkish governments, such as Demirel’s in 1976, to take a harder line than they
had intended.” Thus, hawks expanded in both populations as successful templates were
passed on by imitation; accordingly, the state of Greek–Turkish relations over the Aegean
Sea reached the conditions captured in cell III (Figure 2).
Hawks continued to increase as a proportion of their respective populations later in
May 1974, reaching their peak in the August 1976 crisis. The crisis phased out in cell IV,
given that Greek doves were more successful than Greek hawks when matched with an
increasing number of Turkish hawks. In terms of this study, Turkish hawks must have come
to constitute a fraction higher than β in the Turkish population. However, as reactions
are costly, Turkish doves obtained in turn a greater fitness than Turkish hawks once the
fraction of Greek hawks dropped below α. Consequently, the evolutionary trajectory turned
downward. Greek and Turkish doves were repeatedly imitated and the evolution of foreign
policies reached cell I. The Bern agreement in November 1976 indicated the corresponding
accumulation of doves in Greek and Turkish populations.
The evolutionary game implies that the fraction of Greek hawks grew in frequent
encounters with acquiescent Turkish doves following the Bern agreement. The hawkish turn
in the Greek foreign policy was not sudden but steady. Greek policymakers did not initially
discover that to challenge the status quo produced strictly greater benefits than to follow
the dovish template. Learning took time. In fact, the PASOK victory in the 1980 elections
was indicative of a progressively hawkish Greek foreign policy. The PASOK government
labeled Turkey as the sole threat to Greece and supported a more hard-line position over the
Aegean Sea (Papacosma, 1996, 91). A former Turkish ambassador to Athens recalls this
policy shift: “At the end of February 1987 a consortium of companies called the Northern
Aegean Petroleum Company announced that it would start drilling for oil on the continental
shelf 10 miles off the island of Thasos. . . . the Turkish government still expected Greece to
abide by the rules of Bern agreement. . . . Mr. Kapsis retorted that the Greek government
considered Bern Agreement as ‘inoperative,’ therefore it would decide to drill when and
wherever it likes in the Aegean” (Akıman, 2000, 4–5). The state of Greek–Turkish relations
again reached cell II.
Turkish foreign policy became increasingly hawkish once the fraction of Greek hawks
exceeded α. The Turkish reaction of sending a ship to the Aegean Sea in 1987 indicated the
rise of Turkish hawks following the Greek policy change. The 1987 crisis died out just as
 at GEORGETOWN UNIV LIBRARY on May 27, 2015cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
308 S. Ş. Güner
the crisis of 1976 did. Commenting on the 1987 tensions, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut
Özal wished that “such a crisis should never be repeated” (Pridham, 1991, 80). The Davos
rapprochement signaled the growth of doves in both populations returning the game to cell
I once more. The third crisis over İmia/Kardak rocks and the subsequent period of détente
as indicated by the Madrid meeting between Simitis and Demirel therefore smack of déjà
vu. Nowadays, Greece and Turkey follow dovish foreign policies, but the model predicts
that hawks will rise once again in both populations.
The balance of military capabilities is an important indicator of war costs and the
probability of prevailing in conflict. Huth and Russett (1993, 65) take the balance of active
manpower as an indicator of the balance. According to Smith, Sola, and Spagnolo (2000,
741), the balance of military capability indicates the probability of prevailing in a conflict.
Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi (1993, 613) maintain that the country enjoying superiority in
the balance of conventional capabilities has a higher probability of victory and also would
suffer lesser war costs.
Turkey possesses the second largest army in NATO, surpassed only by that of the
United States. Turkey’s population and the size of its total armed forces have exceeded
those of Greece by a wide margin.5 As the balance of forces has favored Turkey, it can be
assumed that the Turkish probability of prevailing in a conflict was high. Greek–Turkish
relations could have unfolded into a stable conflict provided that the Turkish likelihood of
prevailing remained below certain ceilings (γ1 and γ2). However, Greek–Turkish relations
over the Aegean Sea never reached the state of stable conflict, as demonstrated by the
recurrence of crises and cooling off periods. Doves were never completely overwhelmed by
hawks and continued to survive; they even dominated the respective populations at times.
Thus, the unique evolutionarily stable equilibrium the model implies has no empirical
support. Such a result corroborates rationalist deterrence explanations, according to which
challengers ultimately back down given high prospects of a costly defeat (Huth & Russett,
1993; Hensel, 1994).
Implications
In the phase diagram 1 (Figure 2), the process bridging cell III and cell IV evokes brinkman-
ship crises where one party steps down once conflict reaches a high tension level with an
imminent prospect of war (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991; Fearon 1994; Nalebuff, 1986; Powell,
1990; Schelling, 1960; Snyder & Diesing, 1977). Evolutionary interpretation revises the
concept of brinkmanship crisis in two respects. First, brinkmanship is a conscious strat-
egy that includes calculation of risks of a costly outcome and deliberate moves to push
an adversary to the brink of war. Fearon (1994, 577) defines crises as “political attrition
contests where a state can choose to attack, to back down, or escalate further.” Evolutionary
games lack such calculations, deliberate thinking, and purposes. Brinkmanship crises can
be reached through routines, rules of thumb, and imitation. Thus, produced involuntarily,
they do not necessarily result from conscious calculation of risks and benefits. Second, the
game implies and indicates a brink after which tension lessens in crises. Commenting on
the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War, Dixit and Nalebuff (1991, 207) maintain: “Just
where was the brink in the Cuban missile crisis?. . . The answer, of course, is that there was
no such precise point, only a gradually increasing risk of uncontrollable future escalation.”
5For example, Greece and Turkey have population figures of 10,692,00 and 66,130,000 for
2000–2001, respectively. These figures are 8,750,000 and 34,000,000 for 1969–1970. In 1969–1970
the sizes of the Greek and Turkish armed forces (active on duty) were, respectively, 159,000 and
483,000. In 2000–2001 they became 159,170 and 609,700 (Source: The Military Balance, Institute
for Strategic Studies, London.)
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The evolutionary game exposes the brink (the β threshold in the phase diagram 1, Figure 2)
once the evolution of foreign policies reaches cell III.
Bahcheli (1990, 134) argues that “domestic pressures were instrumental” in the out-
break of the 1976 crisis. The model implies that not domestic pressures, but Greek poli-
cymakers’ adherence to the successful hawkish template precipitated the crisis. Süleyman
Demirel and other members of the Turkish population also had to adopt an active pol-
icy bringing higher returns rather than being compliant in the face of Greek challenges.
Thus, the sending of a ship into disputed waters did not necessarily depend upon different
personalities of Turkish leaders in power.
Greek foreign policy would also become dovish, albeit at a slow pace, when facing a
greater number of Turkish hawks. Pridham (1991, 82) claims that “Papandreou’s sudden
transformation into a peacemaker, in contrast to his previous line towards Turkey, contained a
good degree of political opportunism.” Similar to Karamanlis, however, Papandreou became
a “peacemaker” not because of domestic political concerns, but because Turkish foreign
policy became far more hawkish during the crisis than in the initial years of PASOK rule
in Greece. Then it was rewarding to be a dove in the Greek population.
Papacosma (1996) and Kazamias (1997) argue that the PASOK electoral victory in
1981 caused a sudden inflection in Greek foreign policy. However, the first serious crisis
over the Aegean erupted when PASOK was not in government. The second crisis did not
occur in 1981 or 1982 either, but broke out six years after PASOK’s electoral victory. Foreign
policies did not change overnight.
The evolutionary analysis also implies that regime type did not affect evolution. It
made no difference whether a democratic government or a military junta ruled Greece
or Turkey. Individuals, either military or civilian, simply imitated those who adhered to
successful templates. For example, Greece’s passage from military rule to democracy did
not end Greek challenges to the status quo in the 1970s. Moreover, Greece decided to leave
NATO’s military wing following the Cyprus war in 1974. The Turkish military junta lifted
the Turkish veto against such a return in 1980. Hence, the military did not necessarily adopt
an aggressive mode of behavior, and they were not more aggressive than civilian members
of the population (Veremis, 1984, 28).
The model does not predict a costless revision of the status quo. Arguments relying
upon rational learning and inferences could imply that a peaceful end to the Aegean rivalry
becomes likely if Greece or Turkey convinces the other that its expectations regarding
territorial waters are untenably costly (Thompson, 1995, 220). Turkish military supremacy
over Greece can help to explain the current peaceful status quo punctuated by crises, as
no inconsistent expectations about the outcome of war are possible under these conditions
(Blainey, 1988). Alternatively, one could explain the status quo as it represents benefits
to Turkey and Greece concordant with the cross-distribution of power (Powell, 1999, 85).
These explanations differ from the evolutionary approach that permits mistakes, imitation
of successful procedures, and fixed modes of behavior over time. Evolutionary arguments
produce alternative explanations and clarify general conditions under which crises may
arise and phase out with their eventual outcomes (Huth & Russett, 1993).
Rational learning is indeed the focus of various works on repeated conflicts and crises.
Maoz and Mor (1999) present a game-theoretic analysis allowing a venue for studying how
preferences and games change through experiential learning and perceptions. According to
their model, Greek and Turkish learning leading to misperceptions would also produce re-
current crises, while learning that leads to no behavioral change would increase the chances
of peaceful interactions over the Aegean Sea. Leng (1983, 1988) finds that unsuccessful
challengers in a crisis use more coercive strategies in the next one and that successful strate-
gies are imitated in crises involving relatively equal capabilities. We find that unsuccessful
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Greek hawks vis-à-vis a hawkish Turkish population did not become more coercive in sub-
sequent crises. In addition, Leng (2000, 10–11) defines hawks and doves as having beliefs
in coercive bargaining and problem solving, respectively. In Soviet–American, Egyptian–
Israeli, and Indo–Pakistani rivalries, rational decision makers draw lessons and evaluate
gains and costs of being hawkish or dovish in the next crisis depending upon past crises.
Therefore, Leng (1983, 1988, 2000) and Maoz and Mor (1999) do not present evolutionary
arguments.
Conclusion
The evolutionary model explains crisis cycles and indicates conditions for acute conflict
over the Aegean Sea. The model can be reformulated using Malthusian and linear dynamics
(Friedman, 1991). Nevertheless, such a reformulation requires intricate learning assump-
tions, such as nonlinear growth rates or linear rates of changes in hawk–dove proportions in
populations. These are assumptions more difficult to justify than the dynamics based upon
aggregate payoffs. The dynamics assumption of the present model is much simpler than
Malthusian and linear variants.
The model can be generalized to study numerous unresolved conflicts over delimitation
of territorial waters and for rivalries containing recurrent crises. There is a growing literature
on repetitive conflicts among or between the same states qualified as enduring rivalries
(Goertz & Diehl, 1993, 1995). Disputes between Colombia and Venezuela in the Gulf of
Venezuela, between Indonesia and Vietnam in the South China Sea, between Turkey and
Greece in the Aegean Sea, between Japan and South Korea in the Sea of Japan, and between
Eritrea and Yemen in the Red Sea are some such examples (Smith & Thomas, 1998, 79–
80). In addition, there are recurrent crises in conflicts such as the India–Pakistan rivalry
over Kashmir, the Ecuador–Peru over Cordillera del Condor, Nicaragua–Colombia over
the San Andrés Archipelago, Venezuela–Guyana over Essequibo, Ethiopia–Somalia over
Ogaden, Iran–United Arab Emirates over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb–Lesser Tunb islands,
Afghanistan–Pakistan over Pushtunistan, redundant and border disputes between India and
China and Suriname and Guyana (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997).
The approach taken here may be called an analytic narrative, as it combines analytical
tools with the narrative form, paying close attention to accounts and contexts (Bates et al.,
1998, 10). The evolutionary framework implies a narrative of crises constituting a string
instead of fragmented events (Büthe, 2002, 486–487). This article does not dwell on the
decision of a particular leader or a government but rather on the distribution of behavior in
Greek and Turkish populations.
Nowadays, there is a new government in Greece formed by Costas Karamanlis, the
leader of the New Democracy Party. A government formed by the Justice and Development
Party (a party with Islamic roots) rules Turkey. The two countries are going through a phase
of détente and display gestures of a genuine rapprochement. The current peace over the
Aegean Sea is a point in cell I of the phase diagram 1, Figure 2. This is a static description
of a system at a particular time (Selten, 1991, 7) and implies that a new crisis looms over
the Aegean Sea.
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